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CASENOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
DUE PROCESS-New York Statute Which Permits Prejudg-
ment Attachment Without Notice and Hearing Violates Due
Process Guarantee-Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974) Distinguished. Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F.
Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Recently, the Supreme Court has found notice and the right to be heard,
long regarded as essential elements of procedural due process,1 to be consti-
tutionally mandated in several novel situations.2 More recently, however, in
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,3 the Court signalled a possible halt to the expan-
sion of procedural due process by limiting its recent opinion in Fuentes '.
Shevin,4 which held that a state could not seize goods in a debtor's possession
without first affording notice and hearing. Although in Mitchell several
Justices asserted that Fuentes was effectively overruled, 5 a three judge court
in Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co.6 has construed Mitchell as merely estab-
lishing a narrow exception to Fuentes.
Curtis Circulation Company had advanced funds to Bert Sugar's controlled
corporation pursuant to a contract under which Curtis was entitled to repay-
ment and certain magazine distribution rights. Sometime thereafter, Curtis,
believing that another corporation controlled by Sugar was selling the same
periodicals to third parties in derogation of Curtis' distribution rights, asserted
its prior claim to one of the third parties, who thereupon stopped payment
to Sugar. Sugar filed suit against the third party for breach of contract, and
1. See, e.g., Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 414-46 (1897) (exhaustive dis-
cussion of early cases and authorities); Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277-78
(1876); The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 126, 144 (1815).
2. See note 13 infra. See generally Subrin & Dykstra, Notice and the Right to be
Heard: The Significance of Old Friendv, 9 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LiB. L. REv. 449
(1974), for an excellent discussion of the nature and function of notice and hearing in
modern society and their relation to modem Court trends in procedural due process.
3. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
4. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
5. See 416 U.S. at 623 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 634-35 (Stewart, J., dissenting
joined by Douglas & Marshall, JJ.).
6. 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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the Curtis Company initiated ex parte attachment proceedings in the New
York Supreme Court against property owned by Sugar and his controlled cor-
porations. Curtis filed a detailed affidavit alleging that Sugar had fraudulently
incurred a liability under the contract and was therefore liable to Curtis for
damages in a cause of action for fraud and deceit. Curtis also claimed that
Sugar had assigned, disposed of, or removed property from the state with the
intent of deceiving his creditors. Pursuant to New York's attachment stat-
ute,7 a judge granted the attachment order directing the sheriff to levy on
the property requested, prior to the filing of a complaint against Sugar and
without notice to him.8 The statute permitted prejudgment attachment upon
posting of a bond accompanied by an affidavit attesting to facts similar to
those alleged by Curtis.9
Sugar sought declaratory and injunctive relief in federal court, arguing that
the failure of the statute to provide prior notice and hearing deprived him
of property without due process in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
A three judge court granted the relief, 10 ruling that a prejudgment attachment
statute is invalid unless it provides either notice and hearing to the debtor
prior to attachment, or an immediate postseizure hearing at which the plain-
7. N.Y. Crv. Pmc. §§ 6201-26 (McKinney 1963).
8. The statute expressly permits attachment without notice and prior to service of
a summons. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 6211 (McKinney 1963).
9. N.Y. Ctv. PRAc. § 6201 (McKinney 1963) provides in relevant part:
An order of attachment may be granted in any action, except a matrimonial
action, where the plaintiff has demanded and would be entitled, in whole or
in part, or in the alternative, to a money judgment against one or more defend-
ants, when:
3. the defendant, with intent to defraud his creditors or to avoid the serv-
ice of summons, has departed or is about to depart from the state, or
keeps himself concealed therein; or
4. the defendant, with intent to defraud his creditors, has assigned, dis-
posed of or secreted property, or removed it from the state or is about
to do any of these acts; or
5. the defendant, in an action upon a contract, express or implied, has
been guilty of a fraud in contracting or incurring the liability; or
7. there is a cause of action to recover damages for the conversion of
personal property, or for fraud or deceit.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) requires that a three judge court be convened to grant
an interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement of any state stat-
ute. The decisions of three judge courts are directly appealable to the Supreme Court.
28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
The jurisdictional issues are fully discussed in the opinion of the convening judge,
377 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The single judge considered the novel question of
whether Sugar was foreclosed from attacking the constitutionality of the New York at-
tachment statute in federal court by his failure to defend Curtis' state court action
against him on that basis. Id. at 1058.
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tiff-creditor must prove the grounds upon which the attachment order was
granted. Moreover, the court intimated that a postseizure hearing could not
be substituted for preseizure notice and hearing when the "[plaintiff] has
never had a legally cognizable, concurrent possessory interest in the property
which it attached,"" and when the claim involves an element of intentional
wrongdoing such as fraud, which is not susceptible of documentary proof in
an ex parte proceeding.
Previous decisions of the Supreme Court12 have indicated that a posses-
sory interest in continued enjoyment is property within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment.' 3  Therefore, unless an emergency situation justifies
a summary taking,' 4 or due process rights have been waived,"" a state
11. 383 F. Supp. at 649. The court's unexplained statement presumably refers
to a transaction in which the creditor retains a security interest in goods sold, giving
him a right to possession upon default. Perhaps the statement was drawn broadly to
encompass other situations as well.
12. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (short term deprivation
of household goods subject to vendor's lien constitutes deprivation of property); Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (temporary deprivation of household goods subject to ven-
dor's lien constitutes deprivation of property).
13. The exact nature of the interests which constitute property subject to due process
protection is unclear. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (ten day suspension
from school is deprivation of property interest protected by due process); Arnett v. Ken-
nedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (nonprobationary federal civil service employee's interest in
continued employment not protected); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78
(1972) (interest in renewal of one year contract of first year, nontenured teacher not
protected); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972) (interest in renewal of
one year contract after series of renewals may be protected); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535, 539 (1971) (temporary revocation of driver's license constitutes deprivation of pro-
tected interest); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (provisional cessation of
welfare benefits constitutes deprivation of protected interest). However, whether an in-
terest is protected is not dependent upon traditional property concepts or the presence
of legal title, nor is any distinction drawn between rights and privileges. See Board of
Regents v. Roth, supra at 569-71. See generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE
L.J. 733 (1964); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Consti-
tutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); cf. Roberts, The Demise of Property Law,
57 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1971).
14. An important governmental interest may justify a summary taking. See, e.g.,
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (seizure of vessel
engaged in illicit drug trade was necessary to gain in rem jurisdiction); Ewing v. My-
tinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (confiscation of misbranded drugs).
However, the seizure must be directly necessary to secure the interest, there must be a
special need for very prompt action, and the state must keep strict control over the exer-
cise of authority involved. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91-'92 (1972). In the
context of provisional creditor remedies, an ex parte hearing may only be justified in
a truly unusual situation, possibly including one in which an attachment is necessary for
a state court to secure jurisdiction, see id. at 91 n.23, or when "a creditor could make
a showing of immediate danger that a debtor will destroy or conceal disputed goods."
Id. at 93.
15. To be effective, a waiver of constitutional rights must be knowing, intelligent, and
1975]
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ordered' 6 attachment of a debtor's property must be preceded by procedures
which comport with due process. 17  Consequently, this article will be con-
cerned with whether, in the context of prejudgment attachment statutes simi-
lar to the New York procedure, due process requires notice and hearing prior
to attachment in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Mitchell.'1
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY
PREJUDGMENT REMEDIES
Until 1969, Supreme Court decisions indicated that due process did not
require notice and hearing prior to provisional seizure of property which was
the subject of litigation. It was thought that ultimate adjudication on the
merits would assure that a defendant's rights in the property would be vin-
dicated.' 9 Nevertheless, in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,20 the Court
voluntary. D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972) (cognovit
notes not invalid per se). The contractual language relied upon must clearly describe
the rights to be waived. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972). More-
over, these principles may not apply when the contract is one of adhesion, with nothing
being given in exchange for the waiver. See D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., supra
at 188. See generally Anderson, A Proposed Solution for the Commercial World to the
Sniadach-Fuentes Problem: Contractual Waiver, 78 CoM. L.J. 283 (1973); Clark &
Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 U.
VA. L. REV. 355, 372-77 (1973).
16. The protection afforded by the due process clause extends only to state action.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See also Burke & Reber, State Action,
Congressional Power and Creditors Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment,
46 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003 (1973).
17. The central meaning of due process is the right to notice and hearing at a mean-
ingful time and in a meaningful manner. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80
(1972); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). However, the form of notice
and hearing required by due process varies with the circumstances. See Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The requirements of due process are not technical, nor
is any particular form of procedure necessary. Fuentes v. Shevin, supra at 96-97;
Inland Empire Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 710 (1945).
18. Closely related areas which, however, are not within the scope of this article
are: workmen's liens, see, e.g., Parks v. "Mr. Ford", 386 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D.
Pa. 1974); Ruocco v. Brinker, 380 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Fla. 1974); Note, Post Fuentes
Constitutionality of Garagemen's Liens, 54 B.U.L. REV. 542 (1974); utility shutoffs, see,
e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Note, Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process in Terminations of Utility Services for Nonpayment, 86 HAav.
L. REV. 1477 (1973); and self-help repossession under UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
9-503, see, e.g., Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'I Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974), noted in 35 U. Prr. L. REV. 882 (1974); Spak,
Constitutionality of Repossession by Secured Creditors under Article 9-503 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 10 HOUSTON L. REV. 855 (1973).
19. See McKay v. Mclnnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1929), aff'g mem. 127 Me. 110, 141 A.
699 (1928), which upheld the constitutionality of a Maine statute which permitted pre-
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declared unconstitutional a Wisconsin statute which permitted prejudgment
garnishment of wages on a creditor's ex parte application without hearing or
prior notice to the debtor. The Court distinguished the earlier precedents,
noting that it was dealing "with wages-a specialized type of property pre-
senting distinct problems in our economic system," 21 the garnishment of
which "may as a practical matter drive a wage-earning family to the wall."'22
In contrast to prior decisions, the majority and concurring opinions clearly
indicated that due process protects the uninterrupted use of property. The
fairness of the final adjudication of ownership rights does not adequately pro-
tect against a mistaken or arbitrary deprivation in the interim.
Speculation that the Sniadach rule was applicable only to necessities or to
specialized property like wages was dispelled by the Court's decision in
Fuentes v. Shevin.23 The Court ruled that the definition of property protected
by due process includes the uninterrupted use of goods within a debtor's pos-
session, without limitation to necessities and independent of the fairness of
final adjudication. 24 The Court noted that the central meaning of due pro-
cess is the right to be heard at a meaningful time, in a meaningful manner;
to be meaningful, the hearing "must be granted at a time when the depri-
vation can still be prevented. ' 25  Thus, in sweeping terms, the Court con-
demned prejudgment remedies involving provisional takings of property un-
less preceded by notice and a hearing "aimed at establishing . . . the prob-
able validity . . . of the underlying claim against the alleged debtor."
' 26
Fuentes rejected the proposition that the protective features of the statute
aimed at deterring arbitrary seizures could be considered in determining the
need for a prior hearing. Although these factors would influence the form
of the hearing required, the Court, consistent with earlier decisions, 27 refused
judgment attachment of a debtor's property without hearing or notice to the debtor and
without requiring an affidavit or bond from the creditor. See also Coffin Bros. v. Ben-
nett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
20. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
21. Id. at 340.
22. Id. at 341-42.
23. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
24. No doubt, there may be many gradations in the "importance" or "necessity"
of various consumer goods . . . . But if the root principle of procedural due
process is to be applied with objectivity, it cannot rest on such distinctions.
... It is not the business of a court adjudicating due process rights to make
its own critical evaluation of those choices and protect only the ones that, by
its own lights, are "necessary."
Id. at 89-90 (footnote omitted).
25. Id. at 81.
26. Id. at 97, quoting Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
27. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1971); Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
19751
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to employ a balancing test to determine whether some type of prior hearing
must be afforded.
25
The broad reach of Fuentes may have been sharply circumscribed by
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,29 which upheld a Louisiana sequestration statute
very similar to the Pennsylvania and Florida replevin procedures invalidated
by Fuentes.0 The Court noted that, unlike the Florida and Pennsylvania
statutes, Louisiana limited repossession to goods in which a security interest
had been retained, 31 and required that a judge rather than a clerk issue the
writ,3 2 that the creditor's affidavit be specific,33 and that an immediate post-
seizure hearing be held at which the creditor was required to prove his
claim.3 4  Fuentes was distinguished on the basis of these procedural differ-
ences and the Court held that the lack of a prior hearing provision does not
400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 551 (1965); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
313 (1950); Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-53 (1941).
28. 407 U.S. at 83-84.
29. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
30. The Florida and Louisiana statutes are similar in that both require the creditor
to file a complaint initiating a court action for repossession accompanied by an affidavit
alleging the right to possession of the property; both require the creditor to file a bond
in an amount exceeding the value of the property; both permit the debtor to regain pos-
session within several days by posting a counterbond; and neither provide notice or a
hearing to the debtor prior to the seizure. Compare Law of June 27, 1967, ch. 67-254,
§§ 78.01, .07, .13, [1967] Fla. Laws 660-63; Law of June 15, 1953, ch. 28301, § 13,
[1953] Fla. Laws 962 (now FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.01-.075, .13 (1964), as amended,
(Supp. 1974), with LA. CODE CIv. PRO. ANN. arts. 3501, 3507, 3508, 3571, 3574 (West
1961). There were several differences between the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes
invalidated in Fuentes. The Florida statute generally provided greater protection against
mistaken or arbitrary seizures than the Pennsylvania statute. Since both were invali-
dated, however, the more protective Florida statute sets the constitutional benchmark
and the Pennsylvania statute may be disregarded for purposes of analysis.
31. Under the Florida law, a writ was issued for any goods wrongfully detained.
Compare Law of June 27, 1967, ch. 67-254, § 78.01, [1967] Fla. Laws 660, with LA.
CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 3571 (West 1960).
32. Compare Law of June 27, 1967, ch. 67-254, § 78.04, [1967] Fla. Laws 661, with
LA. CODE Cxv. PRo. ANN. arts. 281, 282-86 (West 1960). Article 281 exempts the
clerks in Orleans parish, the parish under consideration in Mitchell, from the require-
ment of issuing writs of sequestration or attachment. Articles 282-86 otherwise permit
clerks of all parishes to issue writs.
33. The Florida law required only "the bare assertion of the party seeking the writ
that he is entitled to one," 407 U.S. at 74, whereas the Louisiana statute requires the
affidavit to contain specific facts upon which the right to possession is asserted, facts
which if true would entitle the creditor to possession. See LA. CODE Civ. PRo. ANN.
art. 3501 (West 1960); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 616 n.12 (1974).
34. Under the Florida law, unless the debtor posted a counterbond he could not re-
gain possession until final judgment on the underlying claim. Compare Law of June




make the Louisiana statute invalid per se. Rather, by balancing the impact
of these procedures on the respective parties the Court found that the
Louisiana statute imposes a low risk of a mistaken or arbitrary deprivation
on the debtor. This factor, coupled with what the Court considered a limited
deprivation resulting from the seizure of household goods (a refrigerator,
range, stereo and washing machine), convinced the Court that the debtor's
interest did not outweigh "his inability to make the creditor whole for wrong-
ful possession, the risk of destruction or alienation if notice and a prior
hearing are supplied.1
3 5
In holding that notice and hearing need not be provided prior to every
deprivation of property, the Court seemed to employ a different mode of
analysis from that used in Fuentes. In Fuentes, once it was decided that
due process applied, the Court would balance interests to determine the form
of the hearing, but required a prior hearing of some kind as a matter of cone
stitutional principle.36 But in Mitchell, while not disputing the applicability
of due process protection, the Court nonetheless balanced interests to deter-
mine not just the form of the hearing, but whether a hearing was necessary
at all prior to the provisional taking. Since Fuentes broadly asserted that
a temporary interruption of use constitutes a deprivation of a protected
interest, which without a prior hearing could not be constitutional under any
circumstances short of a compelling state need, it is fair to say that Mitchell
overruled Fuentes to that extent.37 Moreover, in weighing the impact of the
deprivation, the Court in Mitchell assessed the relative importance of the
property to the debtor, an undertaking which the Fuentes Court explicitly
eschewed. The dissenting Justices argued that the distinctions drawn
between the Florida and Louisiana procedures were "constitutionally indistin-
guishable"38 and that Mitchell, therefore, contradicted the basis for the
Fuentes decision, not just its broad implication.
The Court's most recent pronouncement, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc.,39 does little to clarify the meaning of Mitchell. Justice White,
35. 416 U.S. at 610.
36. See 407 U.S. at 83.
37. This view of the majority opinion was expressed by both the concurring opinion,
416 U.S. at 623 (Powell, J.) and the dissenting opinion, id. at 634-35 (Stewart, J., joined
by Douglas & Marshall, JJ.). It is interesting to note that Justice Stewart wrote the
majority opinion in Fuentes, joined by Justices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall. Justice
White wrote the dissent, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. Justices
Powell and Rehnquist did not participate, hence the 4-3 decision. The tables turned in
Mitchell, with Justices Powell and Rehnquist joining the Fuentes dissenters in an opinion
written by Justice White, prompting Justice Stewart to charge that the sole basis for the
opinion lay in the changed makeup of the Court. Id. at 635 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 634.
39. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
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author of the Court's opinion in Mitchell, was joined by the Mitchell dis-
senters4" in striking down a Georgia statute which permitted the freezing of
a commercial debtor's bank account through an ex parte procedure pending
a suit seeking a money judgment. The Court found that since the statute
did not require judicial participation, an immediate postseizure hearing, or
specificity in the factual allegations contained in the affidavit, it had "none
of the saving characteristics"' 41 of the statute under consideration in Mitchell.
Without explanation, the Court stated that the statute was invalid for the rea-
sons established in Fuentes and rejected the argument that neither Fuentes
nor Mitchell is controlling within a commercial setting involving equality of
bargaining power. The almost cryptic opinion reveals little except that a
majority of the Court has agreed that Mitchell did not wholly overrule
Fuentes.42
Thus it is apparent that some but not all prejudgment attachment pro-
cedures comport with due process without preseizure notice and hearing.
However, given the failure of the Mitchell majority to explicitly overrule
Fuentes or to establish an objective standard for determining the scope of
due process, lower courts are likely to experience difficulty in gleaning a con-
stitutional standard. The primary question facing the courts is whether
40. See note 37 supra.
41. 419 U.S. at 607.
42. North Georgia Finishing does supply information concerning the viewpoints of
individual members of the Court. Justices Stewart, Marshall, Brennan and Douglas ap-
parently believe that every temporary, nonfinal deprivation of property must be preceded
by a hearing. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
416 U.S. 600, 629 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting). However, there are differences
among them concerning which interests constitute property within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment. Compare Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (Rehnquist,
J., joined by Burger, C.J. & Stewart, J.), with id. at 206 (Marshall, J., joined by Douglas
& Brennan, JJ., dissenting). On the other hand, Justices Rehnquist and Blackmun seem
to believe that Mitchell should be considered to have overruled Fuentes and that Snia-
dach is limited to wage garnishment which is a product of contracts of adhesion. In
all other circumstances due process is satisfied by the -fairness of the final adjudication.
See North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 614-20 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
Justices White and Powell apparently believe that due process does not require a prior
hearing in every case, but that statutes must draw a proper balance between the creditor's
and debtor's respective interests to minimize the possibility of arbitrary deprivation.
Justice White may lean more toward the Fuentes rule than Justice Powell, who would
limit Fuentes to its facts. Since Justice White dissented in Fuentes, his adherence to
Fuentes in Mitchell and in North Georgia Finishing must be attributable either to a
change of mind or deference to the principle of stare decisis. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., supra at 623 (Powell, J., concurring); North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,
supra at 723-26 (Powell, J., concurring); Fuentes v. Shevin, supra at 99-103 (White, J.,
dissenting). Thus, the Court may proceed with a case-by-case analysis, with Justice
White often casting the deciding vote.
[Vol. 24:637
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Mitchell provides a narrow exception to the general rule of Fuentes, or
whether it is Fuentes that has been limited to its facts, and, therefore,
whether the validity of each statutory scheme will hinge upon a judicial
balancing of the risks and deprivations imposed upon each party.
II. Sugar: Mitchell CONSTRUED
Procedurally, the New York statute is strikingly similar to the Louisiana
statute considered in Mitchell. The Sugar court found that the New York
statute contained four of the five procedural elements which the Supreme
Court cited in Mitchell as making prior notice and hearing unnecessary. 43
However, the court found that the availability of an immediate postseizure
hearing which required the debtor to prove the grounds for possession was
critical to the Mitchell holding. The absence of such a hearing under the
New York statute44 rendered Mitchell distinguishable and the statute uncon-
stitutional under the broad Fuentes rule. Moreover, the court found that the
plaintiff's lack of a preexisting legal interest in the property and the fact that
the validity of his fraud claim hinged upon proof of subjective elements of
motive and intent were additional factors which brought the New York
statute "within the Fuentes rather than the Mitchell zone."'45  As the court
noted, Mitchell emphasized that the vendor's current, real interest in the prop-
erty, and the susceptibility of the underlying claim to documentary proof,
were considerations which weighed heavily in favor of the Louisiana statute's
constitutionality. Clearly these three factors make the situation in Sugar dis-
tinguishable from that presented in Mitchell. Yet the court's analysis re-
flects a questionable interpretation of Mitchell.
The Sugar court began with the premise that statutes which do not provide
a prior hearing are invalid unless they "squeeze through the narrow door of
constitutionality left open in Mitchell."46  The court did not undertake to
balance the potential for a mistaken or arbitrary seizure against the impact
of the deprivation on the defendant or the potential impairment of property
value to the plaintiff's detriment, as the Mitchell Court had done. Rather,
43. Both the New York and Louisiana statutes require judicial approval of the writ,
clear demonstration in the affidavit of the grounds for attachment, posting of a bond
to protect the defendant, and return of the defendant's property upon posting of a coun-
terbond. See 383 F. Supp. at 647-48.
44. The New York statute did provide an immediate postseizure vacating procedure.
See N.Y. CIVIL PRAC. § 6223 (McKinney 1963). However, the court found it insuffi-
cient because the sole basis for vacating under the section was that the attachment was
unnecessary for the plaintiff's security and because the burden of proof rested with the
defendant. See 383 F. Supp. at 648.
45. 383 F. Supp. at 649.
46. Id. at 647.
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the court mechanically compared the features of the Louisiana statute which
had been weighed by the Court in Mitchell with those contained in the New
York statute. Thus, it would seem that unless a challenged statute reflects
the Louisiana procedural mix, the court would find a prejudgment attachment
invalid in the absence of a prior hearing under Fuentes. The court did not
explain its narrow view of Mitchell beyond stating that it was "guided both
by the broad rule announced in Fuentes and Mitchell's insistence on the con-
tinued vitality of that rule."
'47
Nevertheless, several factors justify the Sugar approach as a reasonable ac-
comodation of Fuentes and Mitchell. First, as the Sugar court implied,
Fuentes made clear that due process requires an opportunity to be heard
prior to even a brief interruption in the use of property. To read Mitchell
as other than a limited exception to this principle would undermine Fuentes,
something lower courts should be reluctant to do in light of the Supreme
Court's failure to clearly overrule Fuentes.48 The Fuentes rule was an-
nounced in terms of a broad constitutional principle: the fourteenth amend-
ment protects temporary deprivations pending adjudication, and the central
meaning of due process is a right to be heard prior to that deprivation. Al-
though the Mitchell holding seemed to contradict that rule, it failed to assert
a different constitutional basis from that enunciated in Fuentes. Moreover,
since Fuentes is part of a broader trend in recent years extending notice and
hearing to protect against the arbitrary or mistaken deprivation of a variety
of expectant interests, it is difficult to rationalize a view limiting Fuentes to
its facts without similarly limiting a number of other precedents. 49 Perhaps
47. Id. at 650.
48. Apparently the majority of lower courts which have construed Mitchell do not
regard it as overruling Fuentes. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Hixson, 383 F. Supp. 320 (E.D.
Tenn. 1974); Garner v. Tri-State Dev. Co., 382 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Har-
vey Estes Constr. Co. v. Dry Dock Say. Bank, 381 F. Supp. 271 (W.D. Okla. 1974);
Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Peterson, 96 Idaho 94, 524 P.2d 1066 (1974). Contra,
Ruocco v. Brinker, 380 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Fla. 1974); Guzman v. Western State Bank,
381 F. Supp. 1262 (D.N.D. 1974).
49. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-82 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 647-49 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 260-64 & nn. 5-7 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337,
339 (1969). Although a postseizure hearing was available in each of these cases, the
failure to provide prior notice and hearing rendered the procedures unconstitutional.
While it is true that the delay involved between the deprivation and the hearing was
greater in most of these cases than under the Louisiana sequestration statute, the Fuentes
Court noted that even a three-day deprivation could not be constitutional. Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84-85 (1972). Moreover, the statutorily mandated administrative
post-termination hearing required in Goldberg, supra, appears indistinguishable from that
under consideration in Mitchell.
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the new majority of the Court meant to do precisely that.50 Yet Fuentes,
Mitchell, and North Georgia Finishing Co. read together do not signal a re-
trenchment so much as that a new and uncertain majority of the Court is
groping for a constitutional peg on which to hang the exception it carved out
in Mitchell.5' Therefore, until the Court either explicitly limits Fuentes or
expresses a constitutional principle which harmonizes Fuentes and Mitchell,
it would seem more reasonable for lower courts to adhere to 'the Fuentes prec-
edent, limiting Mitchell to its facts.
Second, although Mitchell appeared to utilize a balancing test, it remains
unclear whether the Supreme Court intended such a test as a substitute for
traditional due process analysis. Lower courts may be inclined to adopt a
limited view of Mitchell, obviating the necessity of balancing interests in each
case, especially in light of the Court's refusal in past cases to inject a
balancing approach to determine the necessity for-as distinguished from the
form of-a hearing once the applicability of due process has been deter-
mined.5 2 Without a clearer statement by the Supreme Court, lower courts
understandably will be reluctant to adopt a test which "appears to be a highly
individualistic and impressionistic interpretation of the requirements of
procedural due process, introducing an element of unpredictability not pres-
ent since the Fuentes decision."
15
3
50. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), lends some support to this view. Jus-
tices Rehnquist and Stewart and Chief Justice Burger found that a nonprobationary fed-
eral employee, who under the Civil Service Act could be discharged only for cause, had
no right under the due process clause to an adversary hearing; the procedures established
by the Act were the measure of his rights. Justices Powell and Blackmun thought that
the expectant interest in continued employment is protected by due process, but that a
balancing test must be used to determine whether an adversary hearing is necessary prior
to termination. Id. at 164 (Powell, J., concurring in part). Justice White also agreed
that due process protects the interest involved, and that whether a pretermination hear-
ing is required depends upon a balancing of interests. Id. at 186-96 (White, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975),
in which Justice White wrote, "It also appears from our cases that the timing and con-
tent of the notice and the nature of the hearing will depend on appropriate accommoda-
tion of the competing interests involved." (emphasis added).
51. See note 42 supra.
52. See cases cited note 27 supra.
53. Hobbs, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.: The 1974 Revised Edition of Consumer Due
Process, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 182 (1974). The author criticized the balancing test
further, stating:
Insofar as the balancing test would pit the collective interests of the credit in-
dustry against the individual interest of a particular consumer-defendant, the
test results in the imposition of tremendous burdens upon a consumer seeking
the protections of due process of law.
Id. Cf. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).
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III. CONCLUSION
The broad rule of Fuentes, which required notice and hearing prior to
every nonemergency seizure of property, has been limited by Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co. However, the ambiguity of that opinion and the Court's subse-
quent reliance on Fuentes in North Georgia Finishing Co. leaves the extent
of that limitation in question. The Court, moreover, has failed to explain
these seemingly inconsistent holdings in terms of a constitutional principle.
Thus, it is unclear whether the Supreme Court will regard Mitchell as a
narrow exception to Fuentes or proceed on a case-by-case basis. In either
event, lower courts will find it difficult to adjudicate due process claims until
the Court clearly restates its position.
Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co. seems to indicate that a state may not seize
property for the benefit of a plaintiff who lacks a prior security interest with-
out providing prior notice and hearing, at least when the plaintiff's claim
is one which is not susceptible of documentary proof. Moreover, the court
held that an immediate postseizure hearing is a necessary minimal require-
ment, an interpretation indicative of the court's view that Mitchell should be
limited to its facts. Thus, Sugar demonstrates that, absent a clearer restate-
ment of the Fuentes rule by the Supreme Court, lower courts may be inclined
to regard Fuentes, not Mitchell, as controlling in most cases. In this event,
state provisional remedies which do not provide for preseizure notice and
hearing are likely to be held violative of the fourteenth amendment unless
they duplicate the procedural safeguards outlined in Mitchell.
Carmen D. Legato
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EIGHTH AMENDMENT-The
Harmlessness of Marijuana Must be Conclusively Proven by
the Defendant as the Basis for an Eighth Amendment Appeal
or Challenge to a Sentence for Possession. United States v.
Thorne, 325 A.2d 764 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974).
Statutory prohibition of marijuana has been under intense attack for the
last decade. Efforts by civil libertarians to repeal or alter the drug laws
through the judicial process parallel the steadily increasing use of the drug
by the public and the recent publication of scientific data concerning its
physical and psychological effects.' Changes in marijuana laws have been
1. For an excellent review of the legal and social history of marijuana in the United
States, see Bonnie & Whitebread, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An
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accomplished by pressure on state legislatures, 2 while attempts to alter the
laws by challenging their constitutionality in the federal courts have met with
less success.
3
In United States v. Thorne,4 the defendants challenged the constitutionality
of the District of Columbia's marijuana possession statute on the basis of the
eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Although the con-
stitutionality of marijuana laws has been extensively litigated, this case pre-
sented new questions of law.
Irvin Thorne and Walter Grady were charged with unlawful possession of
marijuana in violation of District of Columbia statutes which impose a maxi-
mum of one year in jail and a one thousand dollar fine on conviction. 5 Prior
to trial, motions to dismiss were entered by the defense charging that classi-
fication of marijuana as a narcotic denied the defendants equal protection
of the laws.6 After the District of Columbia Superior Court granted a hear-
ing on the factual and scientific issues involved in this claim, the defendants'
plea was supplanted by a charge that the penalties imposed by the statute
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REv. 971
(1970).
2. See ORE. REV. STAT. § 167.207 (1973), formerly ch. 743, § 274 [1971] Ore.
Laws (penalty for possession of less than one ounce of marijuana is punishable by a
fine of not more than $100); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 21-28-4.01 (1974), formerly ch.
260 [1938] R.I. Laws (a person found guilty of possession of marijuana is guilty of a
misdemeanor).
3. See, e.g., English v. Virginia Probation & Parole Bd., 481 F.2d 188 (4th Cir.
1973); United States v. Rodriguez-Camacho, 468 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 985 (1973); Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959); United States
v. Maiden, 355 F. Supp. 743 (D. Conn. 1973); Tracey v. Janco, 351 F. Supp. 836 (N.D.
W. Va. 1972). See also Comment, Marijuana Possession and the California Constitu-
tional Prohibition of Cruel or Unusual Punishment, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1136 (1974).
4. 325 A.2d 764 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974).
5. D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-402(a) (1973) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any
person to manufacture, possess, have under his control, sell, prescribe, administer, dis-
pense, or compound any narcotic drug, except as authorized in this chapter."
The penalties for violation of § 33-402(a) are: "Except as hereinafter provided, a
person violating any provision of this chapter . . . shall be fined not less than $100 nor
more than $1,000, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both." Id. § 33-423
(a).
6. Section 33-401(n) of the D.C. Code provides in relevant part: "'Narcotic drugs'
means coca leaves, opium, cannabis, isonipecaine, and opiate, and every substance not
chemically distinguishable from them .... ." The defendants contended that marijuana
was not a narcotic drug, and classification of it within the narcotic category was errone-
ous and in violation of the fourteenth amendment. But see People v. McCabe, 49 Ill.
2d 338, 275 N.E.2d 407 (1971), where the court held that classification of marijuana
as a narcotic drug did deny the defendants equal protection.
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The evidentiary hearing on the scientific issues was extensive, including
an examination by the court of evidence produced by the latest research.
7
Following receipt of expert testimony and documentary evidence, the superior
court found that marijuana was neither addictive nor harmful in either a
physical or psychological sense. Using these evidentiary conclusions as a
basis, and relying on the Supreme Court decision of Weems v. United States,
8
the court found the sentencing statute for marijuana possession to be an
infringement of the defendants' eighth amendment rights. The basic
rationale for the decision lay in the allegedly unconstitutional and un-
conscionable disparity between the innocuous character of the drug, as
evidenced in the hearing, and the severity of criminal sanctions for its
possession.9
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed. Although the court
took judicial notice of the continuing controversy surrounding marijuana, it
failed to consider in detail the evidentiary conclusions of the lower court.
Rather, it relied on the rule of United States v. Carolene Products Co.,10 that
where legislation is based upon questions of fact that are "at least debatable,"
a court must uphold the legislation until such time as the falsity of the factual
premises on which the statute rests is no longer disputed.'1 The court added
that even if it could consider the merits of defendants' eighth amendment
claim, the defendants lacked the requisite standing to bring the claim since
they had neither been tried nor sentenced under the statute. 2
Consequently, the Thorne opinion suggests that prior to substantive con-
sideration of eighth amendment challenges to marijuana laws, the proven
harmlessness of the drug must be demonstrated in conformance with the
equal protection test of Carolene Products. This application of fourteenth
amendment analysis to an eighth amendment case clarified the standard of
evidentiary proof necessary for future reliance on eighth amendment claims
by marijuana offenders.
The majority of federal case law involving marijuana focuses on the due
process and equal protection aspects of the problem, while the eighth amend-
7. Each side was allowed two expert witnesses. The documentary evidence included
G. NAHAS, MARIHUANA-DECEPTIVE WEED (1970) and NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARI-
HUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING (1972).
8. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
9. United States v. Grady, 102 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 1161, 1168 (D.C. Super. Ct.
May 17, 1974).
10. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The issue in Carolene Products was whether interstate
shipments of "filled" or adulterated milk would have injurious effects on the health of
the public. The Court, noting that the health consequences were "at least debatable,"
upheld the statute prohibiting such shipments.
11. Id. at 154.
12. 325 A.2d at 767 n.7.
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ment has received relatively scant attention. This imbalance is due in large
part to the fact that "cruel and unusual punishment" is a relatively undefined
concept, 13 making an eighth amendment claim somewhat hazardous for the
criminal litigant.
Efforts to change marijuana laws by arguing that the imposition of similar
penalties for the possession and use of marijuana and supposedly more dan-
gerous drugs such as heroin and cocaine violate the equal protection clause
have met with little success at the federal level.Y4 The argument advanced
by the Thorne defendants was that the similarity of penalties for marijuana
possession and other more dangerous crimes violated the eighth amendment.
By resting their argument on the eighth amendment, the defendants sought
to avoid case law contrary to their position. Although they were ultimately
unsuccessful, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals was confronted with
the task of stating a clearer definition of the eighth amendment proscription
of cruel and unusual punishment.
I. RAISING THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT QUESTION
Because of the lack of modem precedent involving eighth amendment
claims, courts are provided a significant opportunity either to extend or limit
its application when drug defendants allege cruel and unusual punishment.
The Thorne defendants' approach to the eighth amendment issue centered
around the allegedly unreasonable length of the prison term for possession
of marijuana.' 5 Both the defendants and the superior court relied on the
13. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), where the Court stated that "[tihe exact
scope of the constitutional phrase 'cruel and unusual' has not been detailed by this Court
• . . [but] the Amendment stands to assure that this power [to punish] . . . [is] exer-
cised within the limits of civilized standards." Id. at 99-100.
The relative paucity of eighth amendment cases as compared to fifth or fourteenth
amendment case law is probably due to the conceptually broader bases for argument
under due process and equal protection than under cruel and unusual punishment.
14. See, e.g., English v. Virginia Probation & Parole Bd., 481 F.2d 188 (4th Cir.
1973); United States v. Maiden, 355 F. Supp. 743 (D. Conn. 1973); Tracey v. Janco,
351 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. W. Va. 1972).
15. Two other basic eighth amendment approaches are available to a defendant. He
may complain of the nature of sentence imposed, as in the case of an extraordinary pun-
ishment like death, see Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947);
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879); or exile, see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958). Because the maximum penalty for possession of marijuana in any American
jurisdiction is imprisonment for a term of years, this alternative is not genuinely viable
for marijuana defendants like Thorne. See Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 1.
Secondly, a defendant may argue that proscription of the status of drug dependence
by a state is prohibited by the eighth amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962). But see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). Although in 1974 mari-
juana was classified in the District of Columbia as a narcotic, and hence an addictive
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Weems decision which is the leading federal case involving the length of
prison terms and the eighth amendment.
Weems, a United States citizen in the Philippines during the American
occupation following the Spanish-American War, was sentenced to fifteen
years at hard labor and permanent loss of significant rights for the crime of
falsifying public records. 6 Upon consideration of the defendant's eighth
amendment challenge to his sentence, the Court relied on two tests to uphold
his position. First it considered the relative disproportion between the sever-
ity of the sentence and the gravity of the offense it was meant to deter."7
Additionally, it compared the penalty at issue with penalties for other crimes
of commensurate or superior gravity.'
The key element in the Weems decision was the concept that criminal
penalties must, in some way, be graduated to the severity of the offense.'
This standard implies that it is the court's responsibility to determine the
gravity of the offense in order to correctly ascertain the reasonableness of
the penalty. Aside from the inferential identification of personal gain and
harm to others as possible criteria, the Weems Court failed to enunciate any
specific guidelines, but based its opinion on a wholly subjective determination
of the relative gravity of Weems' crime.
20
Although the Weems formula, which utilizes the length of sentence
approach in resolving eighth amendment issues, seemed to be the best vehicle
for an attack on a marijuana conviction, two conceptual liabilities inherent
in that decision ultimately would have eroded Thorne's position. The logic
drug, see note 5 supra, probably no judge would seriously entertain a defense grounded
on addiction to marijuana. See generally United States v. Rodriguez-Camacho, 468 F.2d
1220 (9th Cir. 1972).
16. Weems was sentenced to cadena temporal, a penalty in Hispanic law which car-
ried a sentence of twelve to twenty years at hard labor and permanent loss of the right
to vote, hold public office, and travel freely. Undoubtedly, the imposition of sanctions
additional to the long prison term played a significant role in the Court's decision.
17. The Court expressed amazement that Weems was so severely punished and noted
that the penalty "excite[s] wonder in minds accustomed to a more considerate adaptation
of punishment to the degree of crime." 217 U.S. at 365.
18. The Court noted that Weems' sentence was greater than sentences for crimes such
as robbery and treason. Id. at 380.
19. See Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Crim-
inal Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635, 640 (1966).
20. A fundamental problem which is common to Weems and Thorne is how to decide
whether one crime is more reprehensible than another. The Court in Weems did not
directly address this complex question and kept its analysis strictly subjective. The de-
fendants in Thorne argued that his crime was relatively innocuous when compared to
other misdeeds carrying a commensurate sanction. The failure to enunciate guidelines in
Weems left very little solid precedent upon which a court could base a reversal of a drug
conviction on eighth amendment grounds.
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employed by the court in Weems to some degree paralleled modern equal
protection analysis, and thus might have invited consideration of fourteenth
amendment case law contrary to the defendants' position. 21  Additionally,
the lack of guidelines for judicial determination of the severity of the offense
encouraged reliance on scientific evidence which was not wholly favorable
to Thorne's contention that marijuana was a relatively harmless drug.
22
II. THE LACK OF CLARITY IN EIGHTH AMENDMENT PRECEDENT
Today, a foundation for any successful prosecution of an eighth amend-
ment claim by one accused of a drug offense related to marijuana would have
to include, at a minimum, two elements. There must be a direct attack on
the constitutionality of the sentencing statute and the production of extensive
scientific evidence concerning the nature of marijuana. 23
Attacking the statute itself is essential because appellate courts will not
overturn particular sentences imposed by trial judges, even if they think the
penalty excessive, if the sentence is within the limits prescribed by statute.24
Secondly, extensive scientific evidence on marijuana is necessitated by the
stringent, though undefined, standards of proof required by the federal courts
21. See cases cited note 14 supra.
22. It would probably be conceded, however, that the clear weight of evidence fa-
vored the defendants' contention that marijuana was nonaddictive. See NATIONAL COM-
MISSION ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTAND-
ING 85-87 (1972).
23. Discussion in this section will be limited to federal case law on eighth amend-
ment challenges to marijuana laws. The majority of state jurisdictions join the federal
courts in rejecting fifth, fourteenth, and eighth amendment challenges to these laws. See
State v. Wadsworth, 109 Ariz. 59, .505 P.2d 230 (1973); Commonwealth v. Leis, 355
Mass. 189, 243 N.E.2d 898 (1969); State v. Robinson, 75 Wash. 2d 230, 450 P.2d 180
(1969). But see People v. Summit, 517 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1974) (dictum); State v. Kant-
ner, 53 Hawaii 327, 493 P.2d 306 (1971). The Michigan Supreme Court has reversed
a sentence for a marijuana offender on eighth amendment grounds. See People v.
Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972). See also People v. Sinclair, 387
Mich. 91, 194 N.W.2d 878 (1972) (conviction for possession overturned, two judges
being of opinion that minimum sentence of nine and one-half years constituted cruel and
unusual punishment); State v. Ward, 57 N.J. 75, 270 A.2d 1 (1970) (harsh sentence
given first offender modified without mention of eighth amendment).
24. See Gallego v. United States, 276 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1960), where the court
stated, "Appellate courts have no control over a sentence which is within statutory lim-
its." Id. at 918. Accord, Rener v. Beto, 447 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Kellerman, 432 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1971). See also Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d
462 (10th Cir. 1959), where the Tenth Circuit refused to overturn a 52-year sen-
tence for a first offender, but noted, "Although this court, sitting en banc, is not
of the view that these circumstances require a holding that the punishment is cruel and
unusual, it is of the opinion that the 52 year sentence is greater than should have been
imposed." Id. at 467.
19751
Catholic University Law Review
on this issue.25 In United States v. Ward26 and United States v. Drotar,27
defendants like Grady and Thorne sought to have their marijuana convictions
reversed on eighth amendment grounds by challenging the sentencing statute
after substantial scientific evidence had been introduced. Lewis Ward ap-
pealed his twelve year sentence for "transference" of marijuana solely on the
basis of the eighth amendment, posing the same question to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit as Thorne has posed to the District
of Columbia courts, namely, "[d]oes 26 U.S.C. § 7237 [the sentencing
statute] impose a cruel and inhuman punishment upon marihuana offenders
in view of current knowledge regarding marihuana?"2 s After considering the
defendant's evidence and the government's rebuttal, the court concluded
that "[current research] has not resulted in the establishment of scientific
knowledge to the extent that would enable us to nullify § 7237 . . .even
if we deemed it appropriate to do S0.''29 Thus the court failed to resolve
the standard by which to determine when scientific evidence is sufficient to
allow an active consideration of an eighth amendment claim.
The same issue was presented to the Fifth Circuit two years later when
defendant Drotar appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana. The
court noted that the deadlock between the defendant and the government
in the debate on the scientific issues surrounding marijuana was "a fair indica-
tion of the status of scientific opinion on the matter at the present time."30 On
this state of the evidence, they reached the same conclusion as did the
Seventh Circuit in Ward, namely, that there was insufficient evidence point-
ing to the benign character of marijuana to justify consideration of the defend-
ant's eighth amendment claim. Although the court cited Ward, it failed to
address itself to -the issue of when scientific proof would be of sufficient pre-
ponderance to establish, as an evidentiary matter, the unconscionable dispro-
portion between penalty and severity of crime required by Weems."1
25. See generally Scott v. United States, 395 F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir. 1968), where the
District of Columbia Circuit expressed interest in constitutional objections posed by the
defendant to the District's marijuana statute, but concluded that the record was too
scanty to support further argument. Id. at 620.
26. 387 F.2d 843 (7th Cir. 1967).
27. 416 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated, 402 U.S. 939 (1971).
28. 387 F.2d at 845.
29. Id. at 848. Ward, like Thorne, cited Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), in support of the proposition that a court may consider current knowledge and
opinion surrounding a contested factual issue. See 61 HARv. L. REv. 692 (1948). See
generally R. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 331 (2d ed. 1972).
30. 416 F.2d at 916. The two year time lapse between Ward and Drotar saw a con-
tinuation of the recent increase in the amount of research, and improvement in the qual-
ity of evidence available concerning marijuana and marijuana use. See Bonnie &
Whitebread, supra note 1.
31. See p. 652 supra.
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III. THE CONSEQUENCE OF Thorne
Thorne attempts to define what scientific evidence the defendant must es-
tablish in order for an eighth amendment claim to be considered under
Weems. Absent a new Supreme Court decision on an eighth amendment
challenge to the imposition of a lengthy sentence, Weems will remain the
basic case law in that area. The problem common to eighth amendment
marijuana cases based on Weems has been determination of the severity of
the offense where facts and information necessary to this evaluation lie out-
side the scope of judicial notice. The scientific controversy surrounding mari-
juana is a prime example of such a subject.
3 2
The Thorne court neatly solved this problem by treating an eighth amend-
ment claim against the marijuana sentencing statute as if it were a straight
equal protection argument. The proportionality aspect of the Weems test
lends itself very well to such an approach. Thorne's challenge could have
been based as easily on the fourteenth amendment as on the eighth amend-
ment. In fact, his original complaint alleged only equal protection violations.
The application of the Carolene Products equal protection test may be due,
in large part, to the difficulty of establishing a new test for an issue in con-
stant debate at public forums.
Under the Carolene Products test applied by the court in Thorne, the
government need only prove that the harmfulness of marijuana is at least
"debatable" in order to defeat an eighth amendment argument based on
Weems. 33  Without solid and irrefutable proof of the benign nature of the
drug, a defendant cannot establish a favorable determination of the severity
of his crime, and thus any valid contrast between it and the penalty he seeks
to avoid is impossible.
The genesis of the Thorne decision is traceable to the difficulty of applying
Weems where the severity of the offense is largely indeterminate. The prob-
lem is compounded in drug cases by the fact that the question of severity
rests on the court's appreciation of voluminous and conflicting scientific data.
Neither Ward nor Drotar eased the difficulty by providing rules to guide the
consideration of the scientific evidence. The court in Thorne provides this
framework by borrowing the Carolene Products rule for the fourteenth
amendment and applying it to an eighth amendment case.
The long range effect of Thorne, if it is followed in other jurisdictions, will
32. In Carolene Products, the Court regarded the physical effects of filled milk on
human beings as outside the scope of judicial notice. Thus the factual issues in Thorne
and Carolene Products, concerning the effect of a given substance on the human body,
are very similar.
33. See note 10 supra.
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be to nullify the eighth amendment as a tool to challenge marijuana laws. 4
Scientific debate concerning the physical effects and properties of the drug
will almost certainly remain unsettled for some years to come. Questions
within the quasi-scientific realm of psychology and drug use may well be con-
tested for decades. As long as the government is willing to dispute a defend-
ant's case with some basis in fact or expert opinion, that defendant will not
be able to satisfy the equal protection test of Carolene Products.
IV. CONCLUSION
The eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment should pro-
tect all criminal defendants. Indeed, the ordinary defendant should not be
unduly burdened in effectively presenting an eighth amendment challenge to
an excessive prison sentence. Under Weems he need only convince the court
that the severity of his sentence is substantially unwarranted by the
gravity of his crime. It is the duty and province of the judge to decide how
severe a crime actually is because most criminal conduct is not susceptible
of quantitative evaluation. Rather, society and the judiciary must make a
judgment within the subjective framework of morals, theology and ethics.
The Thorne decision effectively deprives the defendant charged with a mari-
juana offense of those eighth amendment guarantees enjoyed by almost all
other criminal defendants. Thorne, and the cases prior to it, take the posi-
tion that because the crime of possession is amenable to objective analysis
in terms of scientific proof of the harmfulness of marijuana, courts are pre-
cluded from exercising their subjective judgment concerning the severity of
the crime. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held, in essence, that
it must be totally convinced that marijuana is harmless before it will over-
turn a prison sentence imposed upon one who possessed the drug. The
degree of latitude inherent in the vague reasoning of Ward and Drotar has
been largely swept away.
The phrase "cruel and unusual punishment," though somewhat vague, is
manifestly humanitarian, and a determination of degrees of cruelty is a
34. A strong possibility exists that an extra-judicial decision on the marijuana issue
may be reached in the near future. On November 15, 1974, in a speech before the
Third Annual Convention of the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana
Laws, United States Attorney Earl J. Silbert announced that his office would no longer
file complaints against persons arrested in the District of Columbia for possession of
small amounts of marijuana. Washington Post, Nov. 16, 1974, § A, at 1, col. 1. Al-
though Silbert later retracted this statement, he received considerable support from the
judiciary. See Washington Post, Nov. 20, 1974, § C, at 13, col. 4. The rationale for
this abortive plan rested on the diversion of government and judicial resources away




moral, not an objective, judgment. Allowing matters of science and chemis-
try to preempt an essentially moral question is conceptually inconsistent with
the import of the eighth amendment and will work to suppress the influence
of the constitutional freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. The
Thorne court had the opportunity to extend significantly the ambit of the
eighth amendment in the area of drug prosecutions, but rather chose to limit
it severely.
Joseph J. Zimmerman
CORPORATIONS-FIDUCIARY DUTY-Fiduciary Duty of a
Director of a Nonprofit Charitable Corporation Under D.C.
Nonprofit Corporation Act Is Similar to Duty Imposed Upon
a Director of a Business Corporation. Stern v. Lucy Webb
Hayes National Training School for Deaconesses and Mission-
aries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974).
Historically, the fiduciary duty of a trustee of a charitable trust has been
clearly delineated.' Likewise, a generally settled body of law has evolved
defining the responsibilities and liabilities imposed on directors of business
corporations. 2  Nevertheless, in a charitable corporation, where areas of
charity and business overlap, there is less certainty in defining the duties and
responsibilities of the directors of the organization.3 The rapid growth and
influence of charitable corporations has left many "managers of corporate
charity . . . without adequate guidelines for conduct."'4 And, despite critical
commentary calling for the development of settled standards5 and the con-
tinuing need for such development, there has been little concrete response
to this problem.
A recent case in the District of Columbia, Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Na-
1. See, e.g., Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State
Responsibility, 73 HARv. L. Rnv. 433, 435 (1960); and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 379, comment a (1959).
2. See, e.g., Adkins & Janis, Some Observations on Liabilities of Corporate Direc-
tors, 20 Bus. LAWYER 817 (1965).
3. See W. CARY & C. Bsrrr, THE LAW AND THE LORE OF ENDOWMENT FUNDS:
REPORT TO THE FORD FOUNDATION (1969), where the authors note: "The law relating
to charitable corporations in general ... remains throughout the nation both 'rudi-
mentary and vague.'" Id. at 14.
4. Karst, supra note 1, at 435.
5. "The development of [guides for conduct] is a matter of some urgency." Id.
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tional Training School for Deaconesses and Missionaries,' involved one
court's approach to defining the appropriate duty for directors of charitable
corporations. The case was brought by purchasers of health services from
Sibley Memorial Hospital, a nonprofit charitable corporation,7 against a num-
ber of members of the hospital's board of trusteess and various financial in-
stitutions with whom the individual defendants were affiliated.9 The plain-
tiffs originally sought to proceed on an antitrust theory, alleging that the
defendants'0 were engaged in a conspiracy to monopolize the financial
services purchased by the hospital in violation of the Clayton Act." The
court, however, refused to certify the plaintiffs as a class to bring the anti-
trust claim, certifying them only as to the claim of breach of trust.
12
Consequently, the plaintiffs amended 'their complaint, alleging a conspiracy
on the part of the trustees to enrich themselves in financial dealings with the
hospital. Further, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants' actions con-
stituted a -breach of their fiduciary duty of care and loyalty in the manage-
ment of the hospital funds. Following trial on this complaint, the court
issued a memorandum opinion ruling that while the conspiracy claim failed
for lack of proof, the defendants were guilty of breaching their fiduciary duty
toward the hospital. In reaching this decision, the court first had to define
the nature of the duty owed a nonprofit corporation by a trustee,' 3 and then
6. 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974).
7. The hospital was organized under the District of Columbia's Non-Profit Corpora-
tion Act, D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-1001 to 10991 (1973).
8. For the purposes of this article, the term "trustees" will be used in referring to
the position held by the individual defendants at the hospital. As noted by the court,
this is the title prescribed by the hospital's bylaws and no legal duty is presumed to result
from the use of the term. 381 F. Supp. at 1007 n.1.
9. The amended complaint named nine members of the board of trustees, six finan-
cial institutions, and the hospital itself. Prior to the trial, the plaintiffs dropped their
allegations against four of the trustees and one financial institution. See id. at 1007.
Table 1, id. at 1009, details the individual defendants' relationships with the hospital and
with local financial institutions. Two of the trustees were directors of a local bank, one
was the board chairman of a stock brokerage firm and two were each associated with
two local banks. Each of the trustees had also served on one or more of the hospital's
standing committees.
10. "Defendants" will be used to refer to the individual trustees unless otherwise
specified.
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
12. 367 F. Supp. 536, 540 (D.D.C. 1973). The court certified the plaintiffs un-
der Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Certification was refused
with respect to the antitrust claim on grounds of potential unmanageability, under Rule
23(b)(3). The practical effect of this resolution of the certification question was to
restrict the relief that could be sought to declaratory or injunctive relief and to bar per-
sonal recovery by the plaintiffs for any damages resulting from mismanagement.
13. "[This case] brings into judicial focus for the first time in this jurisdiction the
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measure the defendants' conduct against this standard. This article will ad-
dress the court's definition of the fiduciary duty, the rationale offered in
support of its definition, and the possible impact of this decision.
I. THE FIDUCIARY DUTY
There has been little litigation dealing with the question of the duty owed
by a director to a charitable corporation. This is in large measure due to
the absence, generally, of any need to proceed individually against a trustee
as long as the corporate entity continues to exist.14  Also the very nature
of charitable corporations tends to lessen the likelihood of litigation defining
their directors' duty.15 Moreover, in lawsuits involving the question of the
duty owed by directors of charitable corporations, there has been little discus-
sion of the possible choices courts have in defining the appropriate standard
or the policy considerations underlying the various alternatives.' 6 Conse-
quently, the majority of the analyses on the question of what duty to impose
on directors of charitable corporations has come from various commentators.
Because of "a charitable corporation's obvious similarities to both a busi-
ness corporation and a charitable trust," 17 discussion of the appropriate law
to apply to a charitable corporation has focused on established corporate and
trust law. One main drawback to this approach is that the principles drawn
from the two areas may not be congruent and often are sharply divergent.' 8
nature and scope of trustee obligations in a non-profit, non-member charitable institution
incorporated under D.C. CODE § 29-1001 et seq." 381 F. Supp. at 1018.
14. See Porth, Personal Liability of Trustees of Educational Institutions, 1 J. OF
COLLEGE AND U.L. 84, 85 (1973).
15. For a discussion of the impact of the utilization of the corporate form by char-
itable organizations, see Karst, supra note 1, at 436-37, where the author pointed out
that "in the typical case, no one knows who a beneficiary will be until the charity con-
fers a benefit on him, and after such a benefit is conferred he has no right to expect
further benefits, and thus no remaining interest in the charity's funds."
16. See, e.g., Ray v. Homewood Hosp., 223 Minn. 440, 444, 27 N.W.2d 409, 411
(1947), where the court declared: "The trustees of a charitable corporation, as members
of its managing body, are charged with the same fidelity in the performance of func-
tional duty as the directors of a private business corporation." This statement, noted
in W. CARY & - C. BRioirr, supra note 3, at 60, appears to be a conclusive resolution
of the question of what duty is appropriate for directors of charitable corporations, at
least in the jurisdiction concerned. However, a reading of the case reveals that the issue
was whether the trustees had any duty at all. Hence, the court had only to find a mini-
mal duty to resolve the question. Nowhere in the report of the decision is there any
indication that the court recognized more than a minimal duty, nor was there any reason
for the court to have addressed that question.
17. Karst, supra note 1, at 435.
18. Some areas where the principles of law are in conflict concern delegation of in-
vestment duties, mingling of funds, and self-dealing. In each area, there is a flat prohi-
bition placed on trustees, while business directors can do all three within limits. See
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The existence of two often conflicting sources of law has created a
situation where there is little agreement as to the standard appropriate
for charitable corporations. This has resulted in a split of authority, with
some commentators favoring imposition of a duty similar to that of a business
director, while others urge the adoption of the fiduciary duty expected of
a trustee of a charitable trust.
The arguments in support of imposing a duty on directors of charitable
corporations similar to or less stringent than that placed on directors of busi-
ness corporations are based on two major considerations. First, the form
and structure of a charitable corporation do not dictate a strict standard.
Since charitable corporations are often large and complex entities, it is ar-
gued, directors of such corporations must be allowed to delegate responsibility
to others, something trustees may not do.19 Second, the role and background
of the people serving as directors of charitable corporations necessitate the
imposition of a duty similar to the one imposed on business directors. Per-
sons serving as trustees generally volunteer their services, and yet their busi-
ness experience and standing in the community are critical to the success
of the enterprise. 20 The concern is that exacting too high a duty will dis-
courage prospective trustees from offering their services.
21
While those who advocate applying the standard of a business director tend
to emphasize the corporate nature of a charitable corporation, those support-
ing imposition of the fiduciary duty of a trustee stress the charitable aspect
of the corporation. The fact that the organization's essential purpose is
charity is deemed critical. 22 By its very nature, a charitable corporation lacks
many of the safeguards that protect those with an interest in business corpo-
rations. The absence of the profit motive and stockholders with a financial
Boylan, Endowment Funds-Collision of Corporate and Trust Standards, 18 Bus. LAw-
YER 807, 809-10 (1963).
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRuSTS §§ 171, 379 (1959).
20. One court's recognition of the importance of the trustees was reflected in its state-
ment that "the proper administration of this trust calls for the unselfish, civic-minded
service of men of high integrity, experience and training in the investment and adminis-
tration of large sums of money." Creighton Home v. Waltman, 140 Neb. 3, 14, 299
N.W. 261, 268 (1941). But see Childlaw, Non-Profit and Charitable Corporations in
Colorado, 36 U. COLO. L. REv. 9, 34 n.119 (1963), quoting OLECK, NON-PROFIT COR-
PORATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS § 159 (1956): "[Directors of nonprofit corporations]
are mere 'window dressing' for the organization . ... "
21. See, e.g., Attorney General v. Olson, 346 Mass. 190, 191 N.E.2d 132 (1963),
where the Massachusetts Supreme Court refused to remove trustees of a charitable cor-
poration for an ill-timed sale of some of the trust assets. The court felt that if the
trustees were removed "few, if any . . . would undertake to act as trustees." Id. at 198,
191 N.E.2d at 137.
22. See note 15 supra.
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interest in the continuing management of the corporation decrease the control
that can be placed on the director's activity.2 3 At the same time, the chari-
table purpose of the corporation, by definition, implies a public interest in
how the organization functions. One commentator, favoring application of
the trustee standard, described the assets of a charitable corporation as "more
like a trust res than corporate capital."' 24 And, just as with a trust, the law
must impose a strict duty in order to protect the beneficiaries of the charitable
corporation since they are not in a position to fully protect themselves. To
do otherwise, it is argued, would frustrate the purpose of the corporation by
failing to serve most effectively the intended beneficiaries as well as the pub-
lic at large.
Rather than recognizing charitable corporations as a separate entity and
developing a new body of law directly applicable to the area, the general
tendency has been to decide first if a charitable corporation is more like a
business or a charity and then impose the law from the selected area upon
the charitable corporation. This results in potentially conflicting standards
and provides imprecise precedent for subsequent litigation involving directors
of charitable corporations. What is called for instead is judicial examination
of the particular facts and circumstances of each case, and an awareness that
the directors involved acted with no clear standards for guidance.
II. THE Stern ANALYSIS
The Stern court evaluated the defendants' actions by first dividing the al-
leged breaches of duty into three separate charges: mismanagement, non-
management, and self-dealing. 25 Next, the court contrasted the standard a
trustee would have to meet to be free of liability under each charge with
the standard applied to a business director. The duty imposed on a business
director was selected as the proper measure of the defendants' actions under
each separate charge. In making these choices, the court tended to rely on
prior case law and selected commentary rather than on its own analysis of
the policy considerations involved in the case before it. The court noted
that the "charitable corporation is a relatively new legal entity," 26 but the
23. See, e.g., Hailer, The Model Non-Profit Corporation Act, 9 BAYLOR L. REV. 309,
318 (1957): "The pecuniary interest of shareholders in a business corporation makes
them alert to safeguard their own rights. The same reliance cannot be placed upon
members of a corporation not-for-profit."
24. Lesher, The Non-Profit Corporation-A Neglected Stepchild Comes of Age, 22
Bus. LAWYER 951, 969 (1967).
25. 381 F. Supp. at 1013-14.
26. Id. at 1013.
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lack of original analysis only adds to the uncertainty regarding the basis for
the court's determination.
The court noted that both trustees and business directors can be found
liable for mismanagement if they are negligent in their duties, but business
directors must be guilty of "gross negligence" while a more stringent standard
of care is imposed on trustees. 27 It was decided that "board members of
most large charitable corporations fall within the corporate rather than the
trust model' 28 and should therefore be held only to the lesser business stand-
ard. This position was supported by a 1948 case decided by the Tenth Cir-
cuit, Beard v. Achenbach Memorial Hospital Association,29 and a report pre-
pared for the Ford Foundation on the use of endowment funds.30 Language
in the Beard case does appear to suggest that directors of charitable corpo-
rations are to be held only to a business standard,3 and the case has been
cited elsewhere as support for this proposition." An examination of the
second authority relied upon by the court, the Ford Foundation report, shows
that the authors reached the conclusion suggested by the court, but that in
so doing, they also placed significant reliance on the Beard decision.33 How-
ever, at least one commentator has suggested that the Beard decision may
not represent a clear determination that the business standard is appropri-
ate.3 4 The Beard court showed no awareness of the alternatives available
and applied the general corporate law of the state without distinguishing
between nonprofit and for-profit corporations. Thus the corporate standard
might have been appropriate in Stern if the court had determined that the
organization at the hospital was structured so as to remove the trustees from
responsibility for the day to day decisions and to impose greater burdens else-
where in the organization. Moreover, a statement of this explanation would
have shown that the court was aware of the competing considerations in-
volved in finding a specific duty. Instead, the court took a more simplistic
approach, and apparently blindly adopted the corporate model.
In defining the duty that had to be met to avoid liability for nonmanage-
ment, the court emphasized the significant difference between trustees and
corporate directors in relation to their ability to delegate responsibility for
27. id.
28. Id.
29. 170 F.2d 859 (10th Cir. 1948).
30. W. CARY & C. BRIGHT, supra note 3.
31. See 170 F.2d at 862.
32. Childlaw, supra note 20, at 35.
33. W. CARY & C. BRiGHT, supra note 3, at 61.
34. Pasley, Non-Profit Corporations-Accountability of Directors and Officers,
Bus. LAWYER 621, 627 (1966).
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management of investments. Trustees "may not delegate that duty even to
a committee of their fellow trustees,"35 while a corporate director has the
power to delegate, even to persons beyond the board of directors.3 6 This
difference was important in Stern since the board of trustees relied on a com-
mittee structure to fulfill its responsibilities. Again, the court deemed the
corporate rule more appropriate for directors of charitable corporations, citing
the Restatement (Second) of Trusts3 7 and, again, the Ford Foundation re-
port. It is interesting to note that the reference to the Restatement (Second)
supports the position that trustees of charitable corporations may delegate re-
sponsibility. Nevertheless, it can be read to lend strong support for imposing
a stricter duty analogous to the one applied to a trustee of a charitable trust.
38
The determination of the appropriate duty was perhaps most significant
for ascertaining liability under the charge of self-dealing. Liability under
the two other charges, mismanagement and nonmanagement, flowed directly
from the failure of the board of trustees to use its committee structure to
adequately manage the affairs of the hospital, 39 and the defendants would
have been liable for such failings regardless of the standard chosen by the
court. However, whether their activity40  constituted self-dealing was
directly dependent upon the standard chosen by the court. Trustees may
be found liable for "mere negligence in the maintenance of accounts in banks
with which they are associated" 41 while a corporate director is only required
to "show 'entire fairness' . . . and 'full disclosure' of the potential conflict
of interest"42 to avoid liability. Again, as in the Beard case, the cases cited
by the court as support for its decision to apply the business standard do
35. 381 F. Supp. at 1013.
36. Id.
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TRUsTs § 379, comment b (1959).
38. 381 F. Supp. at 1013-14. The cited section follows a comment section which de-
scribes the duties of individual trustees of charitable trusts. Comment b, dealing with
charitable corporations begins: "In the case of a charitable corporation duties of a some-
what similar character rest upon the members of the controlling board, whether they
are called directors or trustees." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 379, comment
b (1959).
39. Standing as perhaps the most egregious omission on the part of the defendants
was the failure to hold meetings of the finance and investment committees. These two
committees were charged with responsibility for directing and overseeing the hospital's
financial affairs and neither met from the time of their creation in 1960 until 1971. 381
F. Supp. at 1008.
40. The record included findings that the hospital had kept excessive amounts in
checking and other low interest accounts in affiliated banks and that the board had voted
to employ a brokerage house of which one trustee was chairman of the board. Id. at
1010, 1012.
41. Id. at 1014.
42. Id.
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not clearly show that those courts had chosen the business standard. In fact,
the mixture of trust and business concepts in two of the cases suggests that
the courts involved were not aware that they were applying a business duty
as opposed to a trustee standard.
43
III. THE BREACH AND THE REMEDY
Having chosen to hold the defendants to the less strict fiduciary duty of
a corporate director, the court turned to measuring the defendants' actions
against that standard. As mentioned above, 44 the record contained sufficient
evidence, particularly as to the board's failure to oversee the hospital's busi-
ness dealings, to establish a breach of fiduciary duty as long as the court
held the defendants to a standard as stringent as that imposed on business
directors. 45
While there is a diversity of opinion as to the proper duty to apply to
directors of charitable corporations, there seems to be agreement that once
that duty, however defined, is breached, a court has a full range of remedial
measures at its disposal. 46 The plaintiffs in Stern sought to have the defend-
ants removed from the board and the board enjoined from having any deal-
ings with a financial institution, an officer of which was also a member of
the board. Further, the plaintiffs sought a court-ordered accounting and an
assessment of damages against the defendants. 47  While the court could have
granted any or all of the requested relief, it seemed unwilling to punish the
defendants and instead ordered only that the hospital develop and record
a statement on investment policy and that all present and future trustees
make full disclosure of any possible conflicts of interest.
48
43. The various references to "trustee" and the need for naming a "successor trustee"
in United States v. Mount Vernon Mortgage Corp., 128 F. Supp. 629 (D.D.C. 1954),
and the statement that one of the defendants had forgotten "his duty under the law to
his cestui que trust" in Gilbert v. McLeod Infirmary, 219 S.C. 174, 190, 64 S.E.2d 524,
531 (1951), could support the contention that neither court had clearly chosen to apply
the business standard to the exclusion of the duty imposed on trustees.
44. See p. 663 & notes 38 & 39 supra.
45. In the area of self-dealing, the defendants argued for application of a standard
even less stringent than that applied to a business director. See 381 F. Supp. at 1014.
46. See, e.g., Boylan, Endowment Funds--Collision of Corporate and Trust Stand-
ards, 18 Bus. LAwYER 807, 815 (1963): "Remedies available . . . include removal of
directors, imposition of personal liability upon directors . . . and injunctive relief.";
Karst, supra note 1, at 462: "Once the standards for conduct are determined, however,
there should be no difficulty in finding a proper remedy to apply to offending fiduciaries.
The whole arsenal of judicial and administrative weapons is available to redress wrongs
which may be discovered."
47. 381 F. Supp. at 1018.
48. Id. at 1018-19.
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It is interesting to compare 'the relief granted by the court with the results
of an earlier decision, Blankenship v. Boyle,49 which was decided in the same
court, before the same judge, and which has many similarities to Stern.50
As in Stern, the main charges were mismanagement and self-dealing stem-
ming from improper investment of cash assets in affiliated financial institu-
tions.51 While the defendants in Blankenship were held to the standard of
trustees of a charitable trust and the breaches were more flagrant, the dif-
ference in relief granted is very striking. The court in Blankenship not only
ordered the defendants removed as trustees and all financial ties with the
interlocking bank severed, but it also awarded substantial compensatory dam-
ages to the plaintiffs, relief denied in Stern.
52
IV. CONCLUSION
The Stern decision defines for the first time in the District of Columbia
the fiduciary duty that directors of nonprofit charitable corporations are
legally obligated to fulfill. 3  .By announcing this standard, the court acted
to put those who would serve in such a capacity on notice as to what might
be expected of them. Certainly, the standard announced was not as stringent
as it might have been, but the choice made by the court can be defended
as necessary to insure the continued willingness of members of the com-
munity to serve in such positions.
However, there are a number of shortcomings in the case. First, since
this was a case of first impression with potentially widespread impact, the
court might have provided more by way of analysis and explanation. As
one commentator noted, "there are all kinds of non-profit corporations,
ranging from the small club to the large foundation . . .with all kinds of
property holdings . . . . 54 This being so, it should follow that no one
49. 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971).
50. While the Stern court did not directly distinguish the case from Blankenship, its
treatment of the latter case suggests that it viewed Blankenship as a clear "trustee" case
rather than one involving any question of the appropriate duty. 381 F. Supp. at 1013.
51. The individual defendants in Blankenship were trustees of the United Mine
Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund and officials of a bank affiliated with
the union. The main claim against them was that they had misused the Fund's monies
and had maintained excessive amounts in checking and other low interest accounts in
the affiliated bank.
52. See 337 F. Supp. 296 (D.D.C. 1972).
53. See Delegation of Investment Responsibility by Trustees of Charitable Trusts and
Corporations, 9 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRusT J., 583, 588 (1974), where the Com-
mittee on Charitable Trusts and Foundations of the American Bar Association Section
of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law describes Stern as "the only decided case to
achieve any notoriety [where] the court applied 'corporate theory' concepts.
54. Palsey, supra note 34, at 626.
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standard will be directly applicable in each situation. While the result in
Stern may have been the most appropriate given the circumstances of the
case,5 5 a more detailed analysis would have laid a foundation for use by
courts in the future in determining the appropriate fiduciary duty owed to
a charitable corporation.
The type of relief granted also raises questions regarding the court's de-
cision. Again, while the relief granted may have been dictated by particular
factors in this case,5 6 the lack of any indication that personal recovery might
be appropriate in similar situations can only discourage further litigation.
This is particularly troublesome since, as the court noted, persons with poten-
tial conflicts of interest, similar to those of the defendants, will likely be asked
to serve on boards of trustees in the future.57 Moreover, the inability of
part-time volunteers to adequately direct the business affairs of the hospital
without additional assistance will not change.58  The granting of some
measure of relief might have served to insure that interested persons would
monitor the affairs of the hospital and bring suit to correct discrepancies
should any arise in the future. As matters now stand, a duty has been an-
nounced. However, the duty represents a relatively light standard of conduct
and unless a future decision provides more significant relief, it is unlikely that
many will assume the burden of seeking its judicial enforcement.
William E. Brew
55. The court was most concerned with the failure of the board to oversee the finan-
cial affairs of the hospital and this failing was not limited to the defendant trustees.
Since the court was not clearly convinced that the defendants were guilty of serious self-
dealing, see 381 F. Supp. at 1016, it may have been unwilling to impose too strict a
standard by which to measure the defendants' liability, especially since they represented
only a portion of the board.
56. The court noted that it did not appear that any of the defendants had profited
at the expense of the hospital and in fact, "the overall operation of the Hospital in terms
of low costs, efficient services and quality patient care has been superior." 381 F. Supp.
at 1018. This factor, coupled with the advancing age and imminent retirement of the
trustees, may have dictated the weight of the relief granted. See id. at 1019.
57. "[N]ew trustees must come to the Board of this Hospital, some of whom will
be affiliated with banks, savings and loan associations and other financial institutions."
Id. at 1019.
58. As the opinion notes, the financial affairs at the hospital were managed almost
entirely by a Mr. Ernst, the hospital treasurer, until his death in 1972. Id. at 1008.
For a statement by a treasurer of a large university that a full time financial expert must
manage the financial affairs of a nonprofit corporation, see W. CARY & C. BRIGHT, supra
note 3, at 61-62, quoting Report of the Treasurer, 1966-67, BULL. OF YALE U. 22-23
(1968).
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